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A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 19SOI PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES
Clifford V. Donnelly, A.B., M.A.
The thesis here abstracted was written under the 
direction of Henry J. Tomasek and approved by Walter 
E. Kaloupek and Bernt L. Wills as members of the 
examining committee, of which Dr. Tomasek was Chairman.
This study is an analysis of the 196M campaign speeches of 
the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Its purpose 
is to determine the difference in the appeal that the candidates 
made to the voters. A representative sample of the candidate’s 
major campaign speeches was chosen for analysis. Three types of 
content analysis were performed to determine what issues were 
discussed, how much time the candidates devoted to different topics, 
and how they associated the issues together. Three judges were used 
to code the material, and inter-agreement percentages calculated for 
each coder. The results of the contingency analysis are presented 
in cluster and pattern diagrams to illustrate which issues the 
candidates associated together. This sre.dy indicates that thei'e 
were significant differences in the appeal that the two parties 
presented to the electorate.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study is an examination of the candidate’s statements 
during the 196*4 presidential campaign. It concerns what they 
discussed and how they expressed themselves throughout the 
campaign. This analysis attempts to demonstrate through an 
objective procedure that there were major differences in the way 
each candidate presented his appeal to the American audience. No 
attempt .is made to correlate empirically any events related to the 
candidate’s statements; therefore any conclusions that involve the 
effects of campaign behavior upon the electorate are based strictly 
on inference.
In many ways the 1969 presidential campaign was one of little 
interest to the American public. Already it tends to he forgotten 
by many, and even political analysts seem reluctant to revive the 
events which led to an almost unprecedented defeat for a presidential
candidate. From the outset the results of the election never seemed 
to be seriously in doubt.^ The question to he answered was not,
’’Who will be President?”, but ’’By what margin will the Democratic 
Party win the election?” In such a campaign where !. e outcome
^Robert D. Novak, The Agony of the G.O.P. (New York: The 
Macmillian Co., 1965), p. 10.
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seems certain, emphasis is likely he placed upon the candidates
themselves rather than on the issues or other factors.’
The campaign was recognized as being one of the most
r)unethical political races for the presidency in history.
According to Merton this situation may have had some effect on the 
election.
In a context in which political ethics are assumed 
to be rather low, there is a necessity to disidentify 
the aspirant with prevail ng practices and hence the 
purely personal qualifications ("character”) of 
political figures tend to be stressed.
It is very likely that some shift of emphasis toward the 
candidates themselves took place in the 1964 election. Prior to 
the election the Republican candidate let his interest in personal 
issues be known when he chose as his running mate, William E. 
Miller, a politician skilled in personal invective, and who 
according to Goldwater, "drive Lyndon Johnson nuts."1* Presumably 
his role would be to attack the political image of Lyndon Johnson.
Goldwater was less well known than Johnson as the campaign 
began. Polls at this time indicate that sixty-seven percent of 
the population were aware of his political identity. Prior to the
‘Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N. MePhee 
Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 213.
'-Tin- National Observer, November 15, 1964, p. 12.
°R. K. Merton, Mass Persuasion (New York: Harper and Co., 
1946), p. 142.
l!The National Observer, September 6, 1964, p. 1.
Richard Rovere, The Goldwater Caper (New York: McFadden, 1965), p .  163.
3
campaign he had gained notoriety as an outspoken critic of the 
Democratic coalition, and as an uninhibited individual who did not 
always conform to the tried and tested rules of American politics. 
His statements had often been direct, radical, and lacking in the 
necessary tact some observers thought essential in one of 
prospective presidential aspirations.-' Much of the publicity 
related to his bid for the nomination pictured him as a dynamic 
political figure, free of those inhibitions and facades which many 
associate with American politicians.
But there was uncertainty in the minds of many about 
Barry Goldwater as the campaign began. Was he really suited to be 
President of the United States? Was he psychologically fit to 
undertake such a responsibility? These and other questions were 
in the minds of the voters as the campaign progressed. Most 
probably his statements during the course of the campaign helped 
answer some of these questions.
Lyndon Johnson, in contrast to the Republican candidate, was 
quite well known on the American political scene. He was perhaps 
best known for his political role as opposed to his personal 
characteristics. He had been a "political operator" and "master- 
politician" in the Senate where he achieved no :able success. He had 
always refrained from public statements which were controversial.
His own political testament professed no specific committment to 
that other than God, country, and brotherhood.^ His image with the
'-Stephen Shadegg, Freedom is His Flight Plan (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1965), p. 26.
“'Mooney Booth, The Lyndon Johnson Story (New fork: Farrar 
and Straus, 1964). p. 25.
f-l
American people could best be summed up zs that of a "master 
politician", a man whose personal life and characteristics were 
known second to his political performance.
During the campaign the personal attributes of the candidates 
developed into one of the major issues. Goldwater was attacked as 
psychologically unfit for the presidency, a man of uneven 
temperament who was prone to irrational and hasty action. The 
Democrats contended that such a man should not be given the 
responsibility to allocate the use of nuclear weapons. They 
stressed the need for an individual in the presidency who was 
rational, deliberate, and prone to act with prudence in all- 
situations. These characteristics described their candidate 
precisely and served as a basis to attack Goldwater.
As a result of these charges Goldwater found himself labeled 
as "reckless", "dangerous", and a man who might plunge the world 
into a nuclear war. Johnson, on the other hand, was able to 
assume the role of guardian of the peace, a man whose judgment 
could be depended upon in time of crisis. Goldwater himself has 
recognized this as one of the more important issues of the 
campaign, and one that was most detrimental to his image with the 
voters.1
This study seeks to answer the question, "Did the candidate’s 
statements, in form and content, tend to reinforce their political 
image?" On this basis one would expect that Goldwater’s campaign 
speeches would differ co .siderably from those of Johnson. There
^U.S. News and World Report. November 15, 1964, p. 36.
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should be-more references to conflict situations, aggressive 
tendencies, and change of the political status quo. Whereas 
Johnson could be expected to use fewer political volatile verbal 
symbols, and to discuss the issues with less reference to radical 
action.
What were the topics discussed? What percentage of the time 
did GoIdwater devote to a discussion of nuclear war, the area in 
which the Democratic attack was most concentrated? Did Goldwater 
perceive the world political situation differently than Johnson?
How did Johnson favor changing the status quo in contrast to 
Goldwater? These and other questions, if objectively pursued, 
should provide a basis for an answer to the central hypothesis.
Other specific hypotheses to be tested by this analysis are 
stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Goldwater used more threatening political symbols, 
i.e. war, Communism, nuclear, than did Johnson. 
Hypothesis 2: Goldwater devoted more time to the discussion of
war, Communism, political conflict, and international 
aggression than did Johnson.
Hypothesis 3: Goldwater favored change of the political status 
quo more than did Johnson.
Hypothesis 4: Goldwater favored the use of military power over 
political action in international conflict 
situations, in contrast to Johnson.
Hypothesis 5: Goldwater perceived the world political environment 
as more hostile and threat ening than did Johnson.
6
Hypothesis 6: Goldwater perceived the individual as central to 
the political process whereas Johnson professed a 
preference for the group.
Vice-Presidential Candidates
Traditionally the office of Vice-President of the United 
States has not been of great interest to the voting public. The 
vice-presidential candidates are nominated primarily because of 
political considerations, and their personal characteristics and 
overall fitness for the office of President have often been taken 
for granted.1 Recent events, such as the assassination of a 
president, have tended to focus attention on the vice-presidency. 
The result is an increased consciousness of the responsibilities 
of this office by the American voter, and an awareness that the 
man elected may become president suddenly tfirough unforseen 
circumstances.
The 1964 Presidential election was unusually suited to 
campaign tactics by vice-presidential aspirants because of this 
added interest. Many people gave their attention to what the 
vice-presidential candidates said because they were seeking an 
answer to the question, ,TWhat qualifications does this man have to 
be President?'1 The Democratic Party under the leadership of 
President Johnson undoubtedly wished to take advantage of this 
situation. They chose a popular figure, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey 
of Minnesota, as their candidate. He was comparatively well known
^Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential 
Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1.964), p. 92.
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on the national political scene, and was extremely capable of 
making his views known and understood.
The Republicans selected as their candidate Representative 
William E. Milder of New York. His primary qualifications seemed 
to be more suited to the candidacy than to the office itself. He 
had gained a reputation as a "gut fighter", and as a strong 
exponent of the conservative cause. However, he was not widely 
known even within his own party.^
What did the vice-presidential candidates talk about during 
the campaign? To what extent did Miller attack President Johnson 
on the basis of his supposed participation in political scandal? 
And what was the role of Hubert Humphrey? How did he assist 
Johnson in convincing the electorate to give them an overwhelming 
victory? An analysis of their campaign speeches will help to 
answer such questions as these and to evaluate the role played by 
each candidate in the campaign.
I-James M. Perry, Barry Goldwater. A New Look at a 
Presidential Candidate (Silver Spring, Maryland: The Dow Jones 




The conventional approach to the study of verbal materials 
usually involves the historical technique of gathering a myriad 
of facts about the subject, organizing the facts into some 
systematic pattern, and wi’iting a readable account. Most studies 
in the social sciences utilize this type of investigation with 
notable results in many cases. In recent decades this approach 
has been brought into question by social scientists who demand 
a greater degree of objectivity than is inherent in this 
procedure. They contend that the historian of necessity must be 
subjective in the selection of facts, and consequently 
conclusions are biased. "Lasswell, Lazarfeld, and others have 
pioneered the thought that objective points of reference must, 
whenever possible, be employed. All relevant data must then be 
tested against these points of r e f e r e n c e . N o t  all studies will 
permit the use of such rigorous techniques, but whenever variables 
will admit to measurement, then the study should proceed on these 
principles.
One of the methods currently used in the social sciences 
which aims at such objectivity is content analysis. As a
JDavid E. Weingast, "Walter Lippmann: A Content Analysis,” 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1956, p. 314.
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research tool it has wide application where communications data is 
involved. Berelson. whose book is recognized as the most 
comprehensive presentation in the field, defines content analysis 
as ”... a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."^ 
It is a primary requirement that content analysis be objective. 
Usually tests of reliability are applied to assure objectivity. The 
requirement of systemization is also necessary to prevent personal 
bias from entering into the picture. All relevant content must be 
utilized for the problem considered and for the categories chosen.
If only certain segments of the data are used, then the results 
are subject to error due to sampling bias. The third requirement, 
quantification, is the characteristic which most differentiates 
content analysis from ordinary reading. This does not imply that 
one must always use numerical designations, but some measure of 
quantity is necessary. Whether percentages or rough approximations 
like "more" or "less" are used depends on the degree of precision 
required for a particular study.
Berelsonrs definition is generally satisfactory but is 
widened somewhat by Cartwright who defines content analysis 
as "... the objective, systematic, and quantitative description 
of any symbolic b e h a v i o r . Recent research reported by the 1955 1
1Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), p. 16.
^Dorwin P. Cartwright, "An Analysis of Qualitative Material," 
Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences ed. by Leon Festinger 
and Daniel Katz (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952), p. 275.
Theconference on content analysis supports this expanded view.^ 
instrumental approach proposed by participants at this workshop 
includes as subject matter for content analysis all behavior 
which might conceivably affect the meaning of any communication.
It is assumed that more may be contained in a communication than 
that represented by just the lexical items present in it. The 
instrumental viewpoint holds that manifest content must be 
analyzed with reference to a given context and set of circumstances. 
Unless this approach is taken, content analysis is often little 
more than an affirmation of the obvious.
"The fundamental objective of all content analysis is to 
convert phenomena (i.e., symbolic behavior of people) Into 
scientific data."^ However, the validity of such data rests on 
several assumptions. It is asstomed that a common meaning exists 
for a given content between all parties involved in a 
communications sequence. Unless this is the case no basis can be 
found for analysis. Another assumption is that inference can be 
made to events related to the communication. It should be equally 
possible to infer to both the source and the effects of a 
communication. Content analysis must also rest on the assumption 
that the quantitative description of communications content is 
meaningful. The frequency of occurrence is taken to be an 
important part of the communications process.
-1 Tthiel de Sola Pool et al. , Trends in Content Analysis 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 38.
^Cartwright, op, cit., p. 282.
^William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social 
Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), p. 186.
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The problem of inference is central to any discussion of 
content analysis. Generally speaking two kinds of inferences can 
be made, to the source of a communication or to its effects. 
Critics of content analysis point out that few studies have 
empirically related content data to associated events. Most 
authors simply generalize from their results.^" It is, of course, 
preferable to have relationships between variables empirically 
verified whenever possible, but in many instances this is not 
feasible. In such cases it is necessary to make inference from 
the data at hand. The validity of such inference in content 
analysis depends primarily on the scientific rigor of the analysis 
itself. If the study is procedurally correct and strict measures 
of reliability are applied, then objective statements can be made
prelating the data to its antecedent or consequent conditions.
Analysis may be made of any type of communications material 
emanating from individuals or groups. Most of the work in content 
analysis is carried out In the fields of journalism, psychology, 
and political science. In the area of politics Lasswell has 
pioneered research utilizing content analysis. In fact, he and 
his associates0 account for almost all of the work In this area 
with their publications beginning around 1930 and continuing until 
after the Second World War. 2
Cartwright, op. cit. , p. 284.
2Bruce Smith et al., Propaganda. Communication, and Public 
Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 113.
°Harold D. Lasswell. Nathan Leites, and Associates,
Language of Politics (New York: George W. Stewart Publishers, 
1949).
12
Content analysis has yet to gain wide acceptance as a research 
method in political science, and it is being used infrequently in 
contemporary research. Its limited approach with emphasis on 
single unit frequency counts have not proved fruitful except for 
certain specific problems in the areas of public opinion and 
propaganda. Recent developments, primarily statistical sophistica- 
tion, and the emphasis on contingency, assertion, and distance 
analyses have made the method more versatile and adaptable to 
political problems. ̂
This study attempts to apply these newer procedures to an 
analysis of presidential campaign speeches. There are few studies 
of a single communicator in a political context. One such article 
by Prothro^ points out a major problem when dealing with prepared 
speeches. Campaign speeches are almost never the exclusive 
product of any one individual, much less the candidate himself. 
Usually they are the combined efforts of many people representing 
differing opinions. Therefore the final statement can hardly be 
considered to have originated from the candidate alone. Inferences 
concerning the candidate cannot be completely valid when made on 
the basis of a political speech. The focus of attention in this 
study is on the candidates as candidates, and not as individuals.
No inferences are made about the candidates as individuals. 12
1Poo.l, op. clt. „ pp. 33-52.
2James W. Prothro, T,VerbaI Shifts in the American Presidency”. 
American Political Science Review, 1956, p. 726.
Validity and Reliability
The validity of any content analysis must be demonstrated in 
some acceptable fashion or the conclusions obtained from such 
analysis will be of questionable orth, Validation in content 
analysis is evidence that the instruments and procedures are 
measuring what they purport to measure.
The validity a measuring device is usually studied by 
comparing the re u'lts or measures obtained from it with 
those obtained ay another device, the validity of which 
is already established for measuring the same characteristic. 
If such a measuring device of established validity is not 
available - and this is often the case - the problem of 
establishing validity becomes difficult. In cases of 
direct measures validity is self-evident. In fact, we 
call those measures direct which unquestionably measure 
precisely what we intend them to.^
In the case of simple symbol counting procedures the 
validity is direct and can be accepted at face value. As JanisJ 
points out, the coder is involved with perceptual discriminations 
which do not require the exercise of judgment. In this study the 
validity of frequency symbol operations can be accepted on this 
basis.
When dealing with contingency and assertion analysis the 
problem of validity is more involved. The contingency method is 
based upon the general assumption that there is a relationship 
between message, their source and receivers. If a contingency
^Richard W. Budd and Robert K. Thorp, An Introduction to 
Content Analysis (Xowa City: State University of Iowa, 1963), 
p. 27.
^Margaret J. Haygood, Statistics for Sociologists (New 
York: Reynal and Hitchcok, Inq., 1941), p. 219.
~'I. L. Janis, "Meaning and the Study of Symbolic Behavior” 
Psychiarity, Vol„ 6, November 1, 1943, p. 219.
exists between events in a communication, it is indicative of an 
association structure res’ Iting in the receiver. But as Osgood, 
points out, one must not assume this relationship to hold true in 
all instances. The total context in which the message appears 
must he considered.
To a certain degree validity depends upon reliability. If 
the study cannot be duplicated by others with comparable results, 
then the analysis cannot be said to be valid. Reliability refers 
to the degree of correlation between two or more coders working 
independently following identical procedures and analyzing the 
same content.^ There are various ways to estimate the reliability 
of an analysis. A generally accepted view is that, "Reliability 
in content analysis seems to be a problem that the individual 
researcher must solve to his own satisfaction within the limits of
•Dhis study design and resources."
Reliability measures for this study will be modeled after 
the method developed by Stempel.L| This technique appears to be 
superior in several ways to other tests of reliability used in 
content analysis. Stempel discusses one of the disadvantages of 
the most frequently used method. 234
^Charles E. Osgood, "The Representative Model", Trends in 
Content Analysis ed. by Ithiel de Sola Pool, (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 73.
2I. L. Janis, R. H. Fadner, and M. Janowitz, "The 
Reliability of a Content Analysis Technique", Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Summer 194-3, p. 293.
3Guido Stempel, "Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis", 
Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1955, p. 450.
4Ibid., pp. 449-455.
15
The fact that two coders have identical frequency 
tabulations does not indicate that they agree one- 
hundred percent. It is possible that they disagree 
on rather sizable number of items, but their disagree­
ments cancel each other out. Evidence shows that these 
errors may excede ten percent of the codeable items.-L
Stempel’s method uses a percentage agreement score which is the
percentage of time the individual coder agrees with the majority
on a given item. In this study three coders are used, so two
forms a majority. If all three disagree on an item, then all
coders are counted as disagreeing with the majority. This item
analysis offers a more detailed picture of coding errors, and
should provide a more accurate estimate of reliability.
l-Guido Stempel"Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis", 




There were many statements, press conferences, and speeches 
by the candidates in the 1969 presidential campaign. In order to 
get a representative sample of what the candidates said, major 
speeches were chosen from different phases of the campaign.
These were matched between the presidential candidates as nearly 
as possible to the time of presentation and general subject of 
discussion. The acceptance speech at the nominating convention 
was taken as tl? first sample. The second sample was the opening 
speech of each candidate's campaign. The third was a foreign 
policy speech, and the fourth the closing address of the campaign. 
These statements should be representative of each candidate's 
views and provide enough material for a valid analysis. The 
four speeches with their date and place of presentation are listed 
below for each candidate.
Goldwater^
1. Convention Acceptance Speech 
San Francisco, California
July .17, 19 69-
2. Opening Campaign Speech 
Prescott, Arizona
Sept ember 9, 19 69
^New Yc.rk Times, (For all dates listed.)
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b. Closing Campaign Speech October 27, 196b
New York, New York
Johnson-*
1. Convention Acceptance Speech August 28, 196b
At1a nt ic City, N.J.
2. Opening Campaign Speech September 8, 196b
Detroit, Michigan
3. Foreign Policy Speech October 15, 196b
New York, New York
b. Closing Campaign Speech November 1, 196b
New York, New’ York
Five major addresses for each vice-presidential candidate were 
chosen as a representative sample of their campaign statements. 
Their speeches could not be matched according to subject matter 
because bot! candidates discussed practically every issue in 
every speech. Therefore some method of sampling other than subject 
matching was necessary. The method used was based upon where the 
speech was delivered. If the speeches were matched as closely as 
possible to the region where they were given, it could be assumed 
that the topics discussed would not vary greatly. Since both 
candidates tended to include many campaign subjects in each speech 
the matter of sampling is not critical In any case. The speeches 
chosen for analysis are as follows:
^Ibid., (For all dates listed.)
1 Oa. u
Miller1
1. Convention Acceptance Speech 
Daly City, Ca1i fornia
July 16, 1964
2. Campaign Speech 
Portland, Oregon
September 23, 1964
3. Campaign Speech 
Oklahoma City, Okalhoma
September 28, 1964




Grand Forks, North Dakota
October 28, 1964
pHumphrey
1. Convention Acceptance Speech 
Atlantic Ci.ty, N.J.
August 28, 1964
2. National Plowing Contest Address 
Plowville, North Dakota
September 19, 1964
3. Address Before The Liberal Party 
New York, New York
September 24, 1964
4. Speech At The University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia
September 29, 1964




In order to determine what the candidates talked about, two
methods were used. The first was a frequency symbol analysis. A 
political symbol is defined as a key word in a political context
'"News Release, The Republican National Committee, Washington. 
D.C., (For dates listed.)
p News Release, The Democratic National Committee, Washington, 
D.C., (For dates listed.)
which elicits definite attitudes and meanings for that political 
society." Words like "war", "peace", and "freedom" are classified 
as key symbols in our society. A frequency tabulation of their 
occurrence in a political speech can serve as one measure of 
attention on the part of the speaker. The ten prominent symbols 







The second measure of attention was a breakdown of each
candidaters speeches into thirteen subject matter categories.
This was accomplished by a column inch tabulation since all of 
the speeches were reported in their full text in the New York 
Times. The results were converted into percentages for each 
category. The categories are listed below and are self explanatory 
with the exception of the one labeled "miscellaneous". This 
category includes all introductions, personal references, and 
general statements not applicable to any of the other categories.














^Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, 
The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1952), p. 29.
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The contingency analysis was based on twelve categories. 
They are defined as follows:
1. Individuality -- any reference to the individual as such, or to 
a small group as a primary factor in the 
political process.
2. Freedom - any reference to freedom, national or 
i n t or na t i o na 1.
3. Americanism - refers to Americans individually and as a group, 
or the United States.
4-. Government - reference to the mechanics and process of
government. References to Congress, State and 
local governments.
5. War - conflict between nations in which the use of 
military force is anticipated.
6. Peace - refers to peace internationally.
7. Change of 
Status Quo - an assertion that the state of affairs as they 
currently exist should be changed. This 
category is coded + if the change advocated is 
a new policy, for example the Medicare Plan.
It is coded - if the recommended change is 1 
a prior status. An example would be a return 
of political rights to the states.
8. Nuclear - reference to nuclear conflict, or the use of 
nuclear weapons.
9. Military 
Power - reference to the military itself, or the use 
of force in the solution of international 
conflict.
10. Group - reference to the group as the primary unit in 
the political process.
11. Communism - reference to world Communism, or representatives 
of the Communist governments.
12. Political 
Action - reference to change taking place through the 
political process as opposed to force.
Contingency Analysis
Contingency analysis was used to provide a measure of 
cognitive association in the source of communication. The method
utilizes a raw delta matrix where each category is coded according 
to frequency. Median values were computed for each category, and 
plus or minus signs entered according to whether the unit frequency 
was above or below the median for that category.
A contingency matrix was constructed to illustrate expected 
category co-occurrences, and those actually obtained through the 
analysis. The expected percentages indicate what contingency 
would occur by change alone. If the obtained is in excess of the 
corresponding expected figure, then the two categories are 
occurring together more often than chance would allow. Significance 
of deviations from the expected value were estimated by use of the 
standard error of a percentage which is obtained from the formula:
For those categories having obtained scores greater than 
chance the significance was computed. As indicated by Osgood,
selected to analyze the data was developed by Osgood.^ This method
Where: p= expected value
q= l~p
N= total number of units sampled
^Osgood, op. cit. , d . M-0.
this method of estimating significance is not altogether 
satisfactory.'* When a large number of estimations are made, five 
percent level by chance alone. Therefore a cluster analysis is 
based partially upon inspection as well as tests of significance. 
Another question relates to the independence of the categories 
themselves. There is no assurance that the contingency of 
category A and B is independent of that between A and C. Never­
theless, it appears reasonable to assume that significance at the 
five percent level becween categories is evidence for association 
in the source of the communication.
All variables are presented in a cluster analysis.^ Those 
variables with either significant plus or minus relations are 
depicted in clusters with varying degrees of association. A 
more precise way of representing categories which are related is 
by pattern analysis. In order to determine the relationship that 
exists between two variables so that they may be compared with 
other pairs, the generalized distance formula is used.
D«|/£ d2
where:
d - the difference in each unit
between plus and minus values.
■^Osgood, op. cit. , p. 65.
^Robert C. North et al., Content Analysis (Northwestern 
University Press, 1963), p. 106.
QCharles C. Osgood and C. J. Suci, ”A Measure of Relation 
Determined by Both Mean Difference and Profile Information", 
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 99, 1952, p. 251.
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Generalized distance figures were computed for five prominent 
variables. The variables were then arranged in a pattern 




Two methods were used to determine what the candidates 
discussed during the campaign. The first was a frequency 
tabulation of key symbols used in the speeches. The frequency of 
occurrence of these symbols may serve as one measure of what 
subjects were most discussed. Symbol analysis also provides an 
insight into the political doctrine of a candidate. They 
represent the collective attitudes of a society and act as 
focal points of meaning in the expression of ideology.-*- Figure 1 
illustrates frequency comparisons for each candidate for the ten 
symbols.
Almost all of the symbols show marked differences in frequency. 
One exception is the symbol ’’nuclear”, a term avoided by both 
candidates. In view of its prominence as a campaign issue, it is 
more eonspicious by its absence than its presence in their 
statements. They tend to be very similar in their use of 
’’government” and "peace". These symbols were used approximately 
the same number of times by each candidate in each speech
^"Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and ithiel de Sola Pool, 
The Comparative Study of Symbols (St lord: Stanford University 

























2- Opening campaign speech.
3- Foreign policy speech.
4- Closing campaign speech.
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There were differences between the candidates on all of the 
remaining seven terms. Goldwater used symbols with an aggressive 
quality such as "war", "military", and "Communism" more than did 
Johnson. The concept of freedom received more attention by 
Goldwater during the first part of the campaign than it did by 
Johnson. Johnson used the symbol "America" more frequently than 
any other term, and it is interesting to note a comparison in the 
acceptance speech of both candidates. Johnson used "America" 
thirty-two times and "Democrat" three times, whereas his opponent 
used "America" nine times and the name of his party, "Republican", 
thirty-four times. Another revealing comparison can be made 
between the symbols "war" and "peace". Johnson emphasized "peace” 
but failed to give much notice to "war", mentioning it but twice 
in the four speeches. Goldwater, on the other hand, mentioned 
both symbols with approximately equal frequency.
Symbol analysis can also provide some general idea as to what 
topics received most attention throughout the campaign. The 
subjects of war, peace, and Communism were emphasized during the 
course of the campaign, but were not prominent as subjects for the 
opening or closing speeches for either candidate. In direct 
contrast, topics such as freedom and Americanism received most 
attention in the first and last speeches of both candidates.
Another way of assessing the candidate’s differences in the 
use of symbols is to compare totals for the four speeches.
Figure 2 lists the symbols and their frequency. This table reveals 
the prominence given each symbol. Johnson’s use of the word 













Totals: 337 2 03
Figure 2. Symbol Totals for Four Speeches
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any other symbol. Goldwater referred to "freedom” almost as 
frequently, but Johnson1s use of "America" was more evenly 
distributed throughout the campaign. He consistently mentioned 
the term "America" more than the others in every speech.
If the symbols "Communism", "war", and "military" are added 
for each candidate the result is eighty-six for Goldwater and 
fifteen for Johnson. This is the most promounced difference 
between the two and indicates GoldwaterTs very marked use of 
aggressive symbols in comparison to Johnson. References to 
partisanship also differ, with Goldwater leading Johnson sixty to 
thirteen. Almost all of Goldwater*s references were to the 
Republican party while Johnson was reluctant to call either party 
by name.
This symbol analysis indicates frequency only, and not how 
the symbols were related to each other. How the different 
concepts are associated is shown in the contingency analysis. 
However, frequency of occurrence may be assumed to indicate 
emphasis and in some cases a measure of intensity.
Another method of determining what was said and how much time 
was devoted to each subject by each candidate is based on the 
topical categories previously defined. Figure 3 gives the 
percentage of time devoted to each topic for the four speeches.
The candidates tended to concentrate on different subjects.
A major portion of Goldwater*s time was spent discussing inter­
national issues dealing with freedom, peace, and the threat of 
Communism. In contrast to his opponent Johnson concentrated on 
the domestic issues of social, welfare and government. Although
30
GOLDWATER JOHNSON
Subiect Percentage Sub]ect Percentage






3. Communism 13 Social
Welfare
14
4. Peace 11 Government 10
5 • Government 11 Peace 10
6. War 8 Freedom 9
7. Mi s c e11a neous 7 International
Affairs
7


















Figure 3. .Percentage of Time 
Devoted to Different Topics
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he rarely mentioned his party by name Johnson spent considerable 
time discussing political activity in which the participation of 
the Democratic Party was implied. He also devoted more time than 
Goldwater to introductions, references to important political 
figures, and the relating of personal experiences. Goldwater 
stayed closer to specific issues, spent less time on miscellaneous 
topics, and spoke in less general terms than did Johnson.
Wien Johnson discussed war he did so with reference to the 
nuclear aspect of international conflict without mentioning war 
itself. It may be that he did so to give added support to the 
Democratic supposition that Goldwater was not competent to assume 
the responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons. Goldwater 
avoided the subject of nuclear conflict almost completely. He 
talked a great deal about war, Communist aggression, and the 
military forces, but he very seldom associated any of these 
subjects with nuclear weapons.
Contingency Analysis
The contingency matrix illustrates the degree of association 
between the given categories. They are presented in figures 9 and 
5 for Goldwater and Johnson, respectively. Those categories which 
occur together more often than chance alone would allow are listed 
in figures 6 and 7 along with their significance levels. For 
purposes of this study the .05 level was chosen to indicate 
statistical significance.
The variables are presented in a cluster diagram for each 
candidate in figures 8 and 9. The cluster presentation attempts
Expected Values
Iv Fm Am Go Wr Pe CS0 Nu Ml Gp Cm PI
Individuality ■21 .09 . 1 5 .05 .08 .11 .01 .11 .06 .10 . 1 4
Freedom .24* .10 .15 .06 .08 .11 .01 .11 .06 .10 .14
American .15*. 07 .08 .03 .04 .06 .01 .06 .03 .06 .07
Government .21*. 17*.03 .04 .06 .08 .01 .08 .04 .08 .10
War .03 .01 .03 .00 .02 .03 .01 .02 .02 .03 .04
Peace .04 .05 .03 .01 .01 .04 .01 .05 .02 .04 .05
CSQ .13*. 16*.02 .11 .06 .04 .01 .06 .04 . 06 .08
Nuclear Conflict .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
Military Power .04 .11 .10 .05 .05 . 09 MO* .01 .03 .06 .08
Group .02 .05 .02 .01 .01 .01 .03 . 0 0 .02 .03 .02
Communism .03 .05 .06 . 0 0 . 0 4 .08 . 1 1 * . 0 0 .12 .01 .09
Political Action .15 .17 .06 . 1 9 .03 .04 .08 . 0 0 . 0 4 .01 .04
Obtained Values
Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.
Figure 4. Contingency Matrix For Goldwater.
Expected Values
Iv Fm Am Go Wr Pe CSQ Nu Ml Gp Cm PI
Individuality .05 .12 .09 .01 .05 .12 .02 . 03 .19 .02 .19
Freedom .03 .07 .09 .01 .05 .06 .01 .03 .10 .01 .07
American .10 .02 .12 .01 .08 .16 .02 .09 .29 .03 .06
Goveiuiment .09 .03 .06 .01 .06 .07 . 03 . 03 .18 .02 .15
War .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .01 .02
Peace . 02 .05 .06 .05 . 01 .08 .01 . 02 .13 .02 .10
CSQ .12 .01 .15 .19* .00 .02 . 01 .09 .29 .03 .16
Nuclear Conflict .03 .00 .01 .01 .00 .01 .00 .01 .09 .01 .09
Military Power .02 .03 .02 .00 .01 .03 .01 .00 .06 . 01 .05
Group .15 .10 .30*.26*.01 .09 .32*.01 .06 .02 .32
Communism .01 .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 .03 .00 .01 .02 .02
Po 1 it i.eal Ac t ion . 19 .09 .21*. 19 *. 00 .03 .28*.02 . 03 .37*.02
Obtained Values
Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.






1. Freedom- Individuality .21 .24 . 041 -
2. American- Individuality .09 .15 . 022 . 05
3, Government- Individuality .15 .21 . 029 . 05
4. Government- Freedom .15 .17 . 029 -
5. CSQ- Individuality .11 .14 . 025 -
6. CSQ- Freedom .11 . 16 . 025 .05
7. Military Power- Peace .05 . 09 .019 . 05
8. Military Power- CSQ .06 .10 . 020 .05
9. Political Action- CSQ . 06 .11 . 020 .05
Figure 6. Significance Values For
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6. Political Action - Govt.




















Figure 7. Significance Values For 
Contingency Variables For Johnson.
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to demonstrate graphically the relationship indicated by the
contingency analysis.
Goldwater appears to have a closer grouping among all the 
variables than Johnson. Six variables are significant at the .05 
level of confidence as compared to four for Johnson. Two pairs of 
variables are related at the .01 level for Johnson indicating a 
strong relation between CSQ-Go and CSQ-P1.
The variables which are more closely related form the core 
area of the cluster diagram. Other variables which are less related 
are placed in adjacent clusters, and those having no relationship, 
or a minus relation, are placed in separate clusters. All 
categories within a region have plus relations. There are, of 
course, alternative explanations as to why any cluster of symbols 
shows a positive or negative contingency. However, any inference 
that is made is based on demonstrable verbal behavior. Associations 
may be present which are not explicit in the statements of relation 
by the source. It is in this way that contingency analysis may 
bring out associations which arc not readily discernable in average 
reading.
The cluster presentation for Johnson reveals one core area 
centering around cluster C. Other variables are very loosely 
related, or have no relationship at all. A distinctive feature of 
Johnson’s diagram is the number of unrelated categories. These 
separate categories are war, communism, military power, and nuclear 
conflict. He tended to divorce these concepts with aggressive 
qualities from the categories of government and political action.
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When he favored a change in the political situation he rarely 
referred to military force, hut quite often referred to the group, 
government, and political action.
GoldwaterTs cluster diagram is cohesive and contains many 
variables that are closely related. In fact, the only variable 
that is not positively related to another is the group. He tends 
to associate the governmental process with individuality, rather 
than with the group. Freedom, government, and individuality are 
closely related together as are communism, war, and military force. 
Each of these groups form a cluster along with change of the status 
quo. Johnson always associated change of the political environment 
with government, the group, and political action. Goldwater 
associates different concepts with different kinds of change. If 
the proposed change is toward a new policy he perceives it as 
involving political action, the individual, freedom, and government. 
On the other hand, if the change favors previously held policies, 
he sees the change being aided by military force.
Other comparisons can be made between the candidates. The 
concept of peace is more integrated into Goldwater’s associative 
pattern than is the case with Johnson. When Goldwater speaks of 
peace he also urges a change in the status quo using political action 
and to a lesser degree military force. Johnson refers to peace in 
quite a different conceptual context. He associates it with 
communism, but not with military power as does Goldwater. In fact, 
peace is almost an isolated concept for Johnson. He avoids 
relating it to any variable other than communism. He evidently 
prefers to picture peace as threateniened by communism, but to
MO
avoid the association of military foz'ce to defend it against this 
threat. This is in sharp contrast to Goldwater who perceives 
military force as related to communism, peace, and change of the 
status quo. If one were to construct GoldwaterTs position from 
these associations alone it would be this; peace is a result of 
the change that takes place when military force is brought to bear 
against communism.
Another subject of considerable importance in the campaign 
was that of war. The cluster analysis shows the two candidates 
to differ widely in their use of this term. It is isolated by 
Johnson and only occassionally associated with peace, communism, 
and military power. In contrast to Johnson, Goldwater integrates 
war closely with other concepts as cluster G illustrares. When 
Goldwater speaks of war he directly associates it with the use of 
military power to change the political situation.
Pattern Analysis
In order to more precisely determine the interrelationship of 
variables, a pattern analysis was made using five of the previously 
defined, categories. These categories ecre change of the status quo, 
political action, group, individual, and military power. These 
variables were chosen to provide a comparison between the 
candidates as to how each perceives change taking place in the 
political environment. In the campaign Goldwater was assumed to 
have been more in favor of the use of military force than was 
Johnson. His political philosophy also placed emphasis upon the 
individual as an important and vital element of our governmental
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process. These relationships are depicted graphically for both 
candidates by the pattern analysis.
Each of the categories is related to the other and the degree 
of relation measured by the generalized distance method. The 
generalized distance values for each pair of categories are listed 
in figures 10 and 11. These tables show that Goldwater has greater 
variability in the degree of relation between the variables.
The pattern analysis is illustrated in figure 12. Both 
diagrams are drawn with respect to the variable CSQ so that a 
comparison can be made on this basis. A preliminary inspection of 
the patterns reveals a general similiarity between Johnson and 
Goldwater with respect to all of the variables with one exception. 
The variables Iv and Gp tend to be reversed, and the group is 
closer related to the other variables for Johnson than for 
Goldwater. A closer examination of the models reveals quantitative 
differences between the candidates with respect to each pair of 
vax'-iables.
Reliability
Reliability of the symbol analysis was not computed as the 
counting procedure is not subject to a large margin of error. The 
method discussed previously in the chapter on methodology was used 
to compute the reliability of the contingency analysis. The 
results of each of the three coders were compared for each item. 
The percentage of agreement score was computed for each judge with 
the following results: first coder 87%, second coder 68%, and 
third coder 76%. These individual reliability percentages give an
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Variables Distance
1. CSQ- Political Action 1.91
2. CSQ- Military Power 1.9 6
3. Individuality- Political Action 2.09
4. CSQ- Individuality 2.59
5. Military Power- Individuality 3.02
6. Group- Political Action 3.18
7. Group- Indivic ality 3.25
8. CSQ- Group 3.51
9. Military Power- Group 3.56
10. Military Power- Political Action 3.74
Figure 10. List of Generalized 
Distance Values For Goldwater.
Variables Distance
1. CSQ- Group 2.28
2. Political Action- Group 2.31
3. CSO- Political Action 2.50
M-. Individuality- Group 2.72
5 . CSQ- Individuality 3.01
6. Individuality- Political Action 3.04
7. Group- Military Power 3.07
8. CSQ- Military Power 3.33
9. Military Power- Political Action 3.36
10. Individuality- Military Power 3.56
Figure 11. List of Generalized 
Distance Values For Johnson.
Pattern Comparison of Variables For 
Johnson and Goldwater
Figure 12
= Johnson GP = Group
IV - Individual
MIL = Military Power
POL - Political Action
CSQ = Change of the
Status Quo
Goldwater
average percentage of agreement score of 77%. Generally speaking, 
content analysis scores are to be interpreted in view of the 
individual study, the method of category construction, and the 
degree of precision desired. For the purposes of most content 
studies, a reliability figure between 70% and 90% is acceptable„ 
Few studies report reliability scores in excess of 90% when 
categories are sufficiently complex to involve some independent 
judgment on the part of the coder. The reliability figure of 
77% achieved in this analysis is considered adequate.
^Lee M. Brown, "A Content Analysis of Anti-Catholic Documents 
Circulated Through the Mails in the 1960 Presidential Campaign", 




The candidates differed considerably in the emphasis they 
gave to the various issues of the campaign. Figure 13 gives the 
percentage of time each candidate devoted to different topics. 
Miller tended to distribute his time more evenly among the 
subjects than did Humphrey. The Democratic candidate talked about 
his pai'ty, their role in government, and their social welfare 
programs. He spent a great deal of time replying to introductions, 
mentioning the names of prominent politicans, and making ad-lib 
remarks about the area in which he was speaking. He gave little 
attention to the other issues of the campaign.
The Republican candidate talked about almost every issue in 
each one of his speeches. He discussed war, international affairs, 
and Communism more than did Humphrey. He also talked about the 
subject of nuclear conflict more than twice as often as his 
opponent. Like Humphrey, however, most of his time was spent 
talking about his party and its approach to the solution of 
current political problems.
The vice-presidential candidates spent considerable time 
making charges against the opposing party and its candidates. For 















































Figure 13. Percentage of Time 
Devoted to Different Topics.
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areas, foreign policy, domestic policy, political philosophy, 
political activities, and the personal characteristics of the 
candidates themselves. The percentage of time they spent 
attacking their opponents by name on the specific areas listed 
are given in Figure 14.
Miller attacked Johnson primarily on his foreign policy. 
Most of his charges concerned the war in Viet Nam, and the 
posture of the United States in relation to the tlireat of 
Communist aggression. Secondly, he scored Johnson on his social 
programs such as Medicare and the war on poverty. It is 
interesting to note that Johnson’s political activities and 
alleged association in the Bobby Baker affair received less 
attention by Miller than the other topics. However, when Miller 
referred to Humphrey by name, he was most critical of his 
political activities. In every speech he made mention of 
Humphrey’s association with such liberal organizations as the 
Americans for Democratic Action. He denounced his liberal 
political ideas and domestic social programs, but otherwise had 
little to say about his opponent.
Humphrey launched a balanced attack against Goldwater.
He associated Goldwater primarily with his conservative political 
philosophy. He maintained that Goldwater’s philosophy was out of 
date and did not even represent the majority view of his own 
party. He charged that if Goldwater was elected he would do away 
with the social security system and put an end to many of the 
social programs of the federal government. Closely integrated with 
his attack on Goldwater’s policies was his treatment of Goldwater






Foreign Policy 37 a
Domestic Policy 23 18
Political Philosophy 23 28
Political Activities 5 42
Personal Characteristics 12 4





Domestic Policy 21 -
Political Philosophy 32 -
Political Activities 14
Personal Characteristics 24
Figure 14. Percentage of Time Devoted 
To Charges Against The Opposing Candidates.
himself. He spent considerable time implying that Goldwater was 
a reckless individual who was prone to act first and think second. 
He characterized Goldwater as unstable and psychologically 
unsuited for the office of president where he would have the 
responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons. Humphrey made the 
strong implication that if Goldwater was elected, he would involve 
the country in a nuclear war with the communists. It is unusual 
that Humphrey did not mention his vice-presidential opponent by 
name. Perhaps he did not want to publicize Miller who was not well 
known prior to the campaign.
Another interesting fact about the vice-presidential candi­
dates was the total amount of time they devoted to attacking the 
opposition and defending their own stand on the issues. Humphrey 
spent eighteen percent of his time making specific charges against 
his opponents. He directed all of his criticism against the 
person and policies of Barry Goldwater, and not to the Republican 
Party. He even had words of praise for Republicans in general and 
especially those who publicly rejected Goldwater. He had many 
good things to say about Johnson, but he was careful not to defend 
him against charges made by Goldwater and Miller.
Miller approached the problem quite differently. His running 
mate was under heavy attack from the beginning of the campaign.
An analysis of his speeches shows that he spent more time defending 
Goldwater against Democratic charges than he did attacking the 
other party. In his attempt to answer the Democratic charges, 
Miller devoted thirty-eight percent of his time to a defense of 
Goldwater on the issues of war, social security, and agricultural
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policy. A lesser amount of time, twenty-nine percent, was spent 
on criticizing Johnson and Humphrey.
Contingency Analysis
The methodology of the contingency analysis is identical to 
that of the presidential candidates. The contingency matrix for 
Miller is given in Figure 15, for Humphrey in Figure 16, and their 
significance values in Figures 17 and 18, respectively.
Miller tended to associate more of the variables and had 
thirteen pairs occurring together more frequently than chance 
alone would allow. This was considerably more than the eight for 
Humphrey. Nine of Miller’s pairs were statistically significant 
at the .05 level of confidence. Only four were significant for 
Humphrey.
The cluster diagrams presented in Figures 19 and 20 
illustrate the association between variables for both candidates. 
Miller pictures Goldwater as the instrument of political, change, 
and when he mentions Goldwater in this context he tends to talk 
about communism and nuclear warfare. Miller did not discuss 
freedom a great deal as did his running mate, but when he did, he 
also spoke of war, peace, and Goldwater. He associates Goldwater 
and his accomplishments with the Republican Party, and pictures 
Goldwater as the means whereby the party carries out its program.. 
But he does not associate the Republican Party with policies about 
peace, war, and international issues directly. His only 
significant association when he talked about Johnson was with 
government. Humphrey also identified Johnson with government.
E x p e c t e d  V a l u e s
G1 Jh Wr Pe Fr Nu Re De Am Go CSQ Cm
Goldwater .14 .12 .08 .16 .10 .08 .08 .06 .11 .14 . 04
Johnson . 03 .09 .12 . 06 . 03 .04 .08 .03 .10 .12 .03
War .24*.06 .04 .03 .09 .07 .06 .04 .04 .06 .08
Peace .16*.08 .02 .02 .03 .06 .06 .03 .04 .06 .07
Freedom .14 .02 .08’'*.01 .09 .03 .04 . 08 .09 .06 . 04
Nuclcce Conflict .12*.01 .04 .01 .02 .01 .02 .03 .03 .01 .03
Republican .19*. 02 .03 .07*.01 .00 .01 .02 .06 .14 .07
Democrat .09 .02 .05 .02 .01 .01 .00 .08 .05 .08 .03
American .03 .01 .01 .00 .03 .01 .00 .00 .03 .10 .04
Government .10 .13’*.01 .01 .06 .01 .09 .01 .02 .12 .03
CSQ .23*.10 .02 .04 .01 .00 . 2 lv■. 06 .08 .09 .03
Communism .01 .01 .03 .09* .10*. 09 "t o o .01 .03 .01 .09*
Obtained Va]ues
Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.
Figure 15. Contingency Values For Miller.
Expected Values
G1 Jh Wr Pe Fr Nu Re De Am Go CSO Cm
Goldwater .05 .05 .06 .11 .09 .08 .03 .04 .09 .11 .08
Johnson .0*1 . 02 .02 . 09 . 06 . 00 .02 . 08 . 09 .12 . 00
War .12*.02 .04 .02 .04 .08 .03 .01 .06 .06 .08
Peace .06 .03 .10 .11 .03 . 04 .06 .03 .08 .02 .02
freedom .06 . 06 .02 . 04 .02 . 06 . 06 .07 .01 .05 .01
Nuclear Conflict .19*.00 .01 .01 .00 .02 .01 .01 .01 .04 .03
Republican .07 .01 .04 .01 .02 .01 .12 .09 .06 .06 .10
Democrat .0*1 .07 .01 .08 .03 .00 .09 .14 .16 .18 .02
American .03 .07 .01 .02 .04 .00 .04 .12* .06 .06 .09
Government .08 . 2 3 -'* . 0 5 . 02 . 0 0 .05 . 0 0 . 2 0 * . L . 1 2 .04
CJQ .13*.10 .03 . 01 .03 . 0 2 . 0 5 . 2 6 * .05 .2 2 * .08
Communism .10 . 0 0 .05 , 01 . 0 0 .02 .08 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 2 . 06
Obtainee Values
Note: * indicates obtained greater than expected value.






1 . Goldwater- War . 12 .24 .030 .05
2 . Goldwater- Peace .08 .16 .028 .05
3. Goldwater- Nuclear .10 .12 .029 -
4. Go 1 cIwater- Repub1ican .08 .19 .027 .05
5. Goldwater- CSQ .14 .23 .033 .05
6. Johnson- Government . 1 0 .13 .029 -
7. War- Freedom .06 .11 .024 .05
8. Peace- Republican .06 .07 .024 -
9 . Peace- Communism .07 .09 .025 -
.0. Freedom- Communism . 06 .10 .024 .05
.1. Nuclear Communism .04 .09 .019 .05
.2. Republican- CSQ .10 .21 .029 .01
3. Communism- CSQ .03 .09 .019 .01
Figure 17. Significance Values For






1. Goldwater- War . 06 . 12 . 029 .05
2. G o1dw at er- Nu clear .08 .09 .026
-
3. Goldwater- CSQ .11 .13 . U30
-
M. Johnson- Government .10 .23 .029
.05
S. Democrat- American .09 .12 .027
-
6. CSQ- Democrat .16 .20 .035
-
7. Government- Democrat .18 .26 .036
.01
8. Government- CSQ .12 .22 .031
.01
Figure 18. Significance Values For 
Contingency Variables For Humphrey.
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Figure 19. Cluster' Diagram 
For Miller.

Miller disassociated the terms Democrat and American from any of
the other categories.
Humphrey’s cluster analysis shows two major groups. Group 1 
is composed of clusters B , C, and D, and group 2 is composed of 
clusters F, G, and H. The first group contains variables all of 
which are related 1:o Johnson. Humphrey associates him with the 
government, the political process, his party, and America. He 
does not mention Johnson in conjunction with war, communism, peace, 
or freedom. He linked Goldwater with war, nuclear conflict, and 
the changing of the status quo. Usually this was in the form of 
a charge that Goldwater would defend freedom by plunging the 
country into nuclear war with the Communists. He divorced 
Goldwater from the RepublicanParty and did not associate the 
party itself with controversial issues.
Reliability
The reliability af the vice-presidential analysis was computed 
in the same manner as for the presidential analysis. The same 
judges were used and their percentage of agreement scores were all 
slightly higher than for the previous analysis. The first coder’s 
score was 9.1%, the second 72%, and the third 84%. The increase in 
agreement among the coders is in all probability due to practice 
effect since this coding was completed after the presidential 
analysis. The overall reliability score for the vice-presidential 
analysis was 82.5%, and is within acceptable limits.
CHAPTER VI
Conclusions
Normally the difference in policy positions taken by the two 
parties are moderate. V. 0. Key expresses this idea and draws 
its implications for American politics:
Each party leadership must maintain the loyalty of 
its own standpatters; it must also concern itself with 
the great blocks of voters uncommitted to either party 
as well as with those who may be weaned away from the 
opposition. These influences tend to pull the party 
leaderships from their contrasting anchorages toward the 
center. In that process, perhaps most visable in 
presidential campaigns, the party appeals often sound 
much alike and thereby contribute to the bewilderment of 
observers of American politics.
Another moderating factor in party politics are the issues involved 
in the campaign. In the absence of major natxonal issues the two
parties tend to decentralize and express only the vaguest of 
party ideology.2 Issues of major importance such as that of 
nationalism versus states' rights in 1832, the maintenance of the 
Union in I860, and the economic problems of 1932 occur infrequently.
There were important issues in the .19 69 campaign, but none impressed 
the voters as being vital enough to cause a realignment among the 
parties.
. 0. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: 
Crowell, 1958), p. 291.
"Stanley Kelly, Jr., Political Campaigning (Menasha,
Wisconsin: The George Santa Company, Inc., 1960), p. 198.
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The Republican Party seems to have abandoned the traditional 
tendency toward Moderation in the 1966 campaign. Their national 
campaign slogan was a pledge to give the country "a choice, not 
an echo."* The Republican candidates attempted to present their 
program as a sharp contrast to the Democrats, and thus provide 
the voter with a distinct choice at election time. It is probable 
that they succeeded in accomplishing their aim. The results of 
tills study indicate that the Republican candidates differed 
significantly from their Democratic opponents in their appeal to 
the electorate.
The Republicans were decidedly more partisan in their 
campaigning. Their promises were always associated with the 
Republican Party and Barry Goldwater as the means whereby the 
changes would take place. Candidate Goldwater also emphasized the 
individual as Idle most important element in the American political 
process. This was in sharp contrast to the Democratic candidates 
whose appeal for unity was one of their primary campaign themes. 
President Johnson rarely mentioned the Democratic Party, but he 
referred many times to "most Americans" and "the majority in our 
country". The Democratic appeal was directed to the American 
people in general. Johnson perceived a majority of the people to 
be the primary political unit in our society. Both vice- 
presidential candidates were highly partisan in their speeches, but 
Humphrey associated his statements with larger segments of the 
population than did Miller.
blames M. Perry, Barry Goldwater: A New Look at a Presidential 
Candidate (Silver Spring, Maryland: The Dow Jones Company, 1966),
p. 95.
The program advocated by the Republicans provided a distinct 
alternative to Democratic policy, and in almost every ease the 
distinction was based on GoldwatcrTs promise to reduce the 
functions of the federal government. Although he seemed to modify 
ills view somewhat, he still maintained that the proper duty of 
elected officials is to "divest themselves of the power they have 
been given”.* Therefore the Republican proposal for change was 
negative in character, and really no change at all. All it 
amounted to was a curtailment of the programs that were initiated 
with the Democratic New Deal legislation in the 1930Ts. As this 
analysis has pointed out, much of the Republican appeal was 
reduced to an apology for this negative approach., with Miller 
devoting himself to a defense of GoldwaterTs domestic policy.
If Republican replies are any measure of the effectiveness of 
Democratic charges, then it appears that the Democrats were 
successful. Both Republican candidates placed themselves on the 
defensive from the beginning of the campaign. In particular, 
they made lengthy replies to Democratic charges about war and the 
use of nuclear weapons. Goldwater almost completely avoided the 
subject of nuclear weapons and left the difficult task of 
defending him on this issue to his running mate, William Miller. 
This proved to he extremely difficult in view of the fact that 
Goldwater kept making speeches about the necessity cl war in the 
defense of freedom. Goldwater may have been correct in his thesis,
* Barry M. Goldwater, The Concience of a Conservative, 
(Shepherdsville, Kentucky: The Victor Publishing Company, 196(i)_.
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that the willingness to go to war is an essential element in the 
deterrence to Communist aggression, but was it wise for him to 
interject this as a prominent campaign issue? Probably not, since 
the continued reference to war tended to reinforce his already 
unfavorable image as a reckless individual who favored war as a 
solution to political conflict. The Democratic candidates, both 
of whom were considerably more sophisticated in their approach to 
politics than Goldwater and Miller, were most reluctant to discuss 
issues which even implied the necessity for hostilities. And when 
they did discuss the subject of war, they did so with unfavorable 
references to Goldwater. This study shows that Goldwater made 
considerable, efforts in the campaign to change his image with the 
voters. Most political analysts have marked this as one of the 
major factors in voter rejection of Goldwater, and Goldwater 
himself has agreed.'
The Democrats tended to avoid controversial issues, and when 
they did discuss them they attempted to associate the subject with 
the names or policies of their opponents. The more controversial 
the subject, such as the issue of war, the more general and vague 
were the statements of the Democratic candidates. This is in 
accord with traditional political campaign methods as reported by 
Berelson.^ Goldwater and Miller were generally more definite and 
specific on all the issues than the Democrat.. President Johnson
U.S. News and World Report, Dec ember 21, 196 4.
‘•Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N. McPhee, 
Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). p. 174.
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made a great many statements about subjects that no one would take 
issue with, such as ’’this is the time of peace on earth and good­
will among men.”1 This statement, characteristic of Johnson’s 
speeches, can be contrasted with a typical and now famous statement 
from Goldwater’s acceptance speech. "I would remind you that
extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind
2you that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue". The 
Republican candidate spoke throughout the campaign with a candor 
not usually found in American politicans. Goldwater often made 
statements that Hubert Humphrey used in his indictment of Goldwater 
as a political personality. Even Goldwater’s own close associate 
and political advisor, Denison Kitchel, admitted that Goldwater was 
not always diplomatic.
So many people have said he’s a bomb-lobber and a 
shoot-from-the-hip kind of guy. He’s not that way at 
all. But, in all areas, personal or political, he is 
so candid and. forthright that it surprises everyone.
Politicians just don’t talk that way; they try to be 
more diplomatic.̂
It was William Miller, Goldwater’s running mate, who was 
supposed to be a "tiger on Ihe attack in an attacking year”.!i 
However, his campaign statements were less radical than those of 
Goldwater. His attack on Johnson’s political activities was 
supposed to be one of the major Republican campaign efforts. Instead
LNews Release, The Democratic National Convention, Washington, 
D.C., October 27, 1969.
^New York Times, July 17, 1969.
Perry, op. cit. , p. 92.
^Perry, op. cit.. p. 129.
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of being a "tiger on the attack", he appears to have ended up 
defending his running mate against Democratic charges. Miller 
did not fulfill the role that was apparently chosen for him at 
the beginning of the campaign.
This study supports the hypothesis that GoldwaterTs speeches 
were consistent with his pre-campaign statements. He continued to 
speak out on the issue, making statements that were too extreme 
and p„ -tisan to gain him wide support. The American political 
system functions on the basis of a governing consensus which is 
always composed of diverse elements.
For it is the essential character of our major parties 
that they are rhe great common denominator of the American 
people, embracing within their hospitable folds men and 
women of all classes, faiths, interests and sentiments. And 
it is the historical function of parties, in normal times 
at least, to be all things to all men. It is this, indeed, 
which enables our two-party system to function at all.
The Republican candidates did not appeal to a broad spectrum of
American political thought, and it is improbable that they
obtained the support of many who were not already devoted to their
cause at the start of the campaign.
There have been few attempts to develop a systematic theory
of campaigning in the American political system. Kelley has
summed up present day knowledge with some general observations,
and one of his axioms states that the expectations of the electorate
determine in part the success of campaign communications.^ The
LEvron M. Kirkpatrick, Elections- U.S.A. (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1956), p. 103.
^Kelley, op. eit. . pp. 146-157.
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American voter tends to reject extremes in politics except in 
times oi national crisis. This study indicates that the campaign 
statements of the Republican candidates tended to identify them 
as symbols ol extremism. In the absence of a campaign issue of 
critical importance, it would seem probable that Goldwater’s 
campaign tactics increased the Republican margin of defeat.
SUMMARY
This study is an analysis of the 196*1 campaign speeches of 
the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Its purpose 
is to determine the difference in the appeal that the candidates 
made to the voters. A representative sample of the candidate’s 
major campaign speeches was chosen for analysis. Three types of 
content analysis were performed to determine what issues were 
discussed, how much time the candidates devoted to different 
topics, and how they associated the issues together. Three 
judges were used to code the material, and inter-agreement 
percentages calculated for each coder. The results of the contin­
gency analysis are presented in cluster and pattern diagrams to 
illustrate which issues the candidates associated together. This 
study indicates that there were significant differences in th<_ 
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